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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has identified its energy requirements as a key 
vulnerability and in recent years has taken substantial initiatives to improve its energy profile. As 
part of this process, DoD leaders have issued guidance documents outlining goals and objectives 
relating to energy. These documents are intended to inform many different decisions at strategic, 
managerial, and operational levels. They specify a wide range of objectives that overlap only 
partially, while identical terms appear in many documents, but with inconsistent definitions. In 
this paper, we review 44 strategic guidance documents and apply a value-focused thinking 
approach to identify and define explicitly a comprehensive set of common objectives for energy 
decisions in the DoD. The objectives and associated definitions are intended to facilitate 
horizontal and vertical communication within the DoD. In addition, the objectives we define 
suggest possible metrics that may be comparable across services and in some cases may be 





Energy is a critical input for nearly every capability of the United States (US) Department of 
'HIHQVH 'R' 7KH'R'¶V energy requirements are also a critical vulnerability. For over 65 
years, US forces have enjoyed uninterrupted access to fuel. This assurance has come at the cost 
of constraints on US foreign policy (CNA 2009) and is not guaranteed to continue; the DoD is 
preparing for anti-access/area-GHQLDO ZKLFK ZLOO SXW WKH VXSSO\ FKDLQ ³IXOO\ LQ SOD\ LQ WKH
battlefield1´ 'XULQJ:RUOG:DU ,, DWWDFNV RQ VXSSO\ OLQHVZHUH DPDMRU HOHPHQW RIPLOLWDU\
strategy on all sides, and access to petroleum was a motivation for conflict (Yergin 1991).  
Dependence of the world economy on petroleum, instability in oil-producing regions, and the US 
role in protecting international global commerce on the seas all suggest that energy is likely to 
GULYHWKH'R'¶VIXWXUHPLVVLRQV&1$009). In addition, DoD installations have enjoyed nearly 
XQLQWHUUXSWHGDFFHVVWRHOHFWULFDOSRZHULQUHFHQW\HDUVEXWWKHLUGHSHQGHQFHRQWKH³IUDJLOHDQG
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$OWKRXJK'R'¶VHQHUJ\FRnsumption is only about 1% of total U.S. energy consumption 
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Moreover, energy requirements are growing; the newest platforms and weapons systems require 
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³FXUUHQW HQHUJ\ FRQVXPSWLRQ SDWWHUQV DUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK QDWLRQDO VWUDWHJLF JRDOV WR EXLOG
$PHULFDQVWUHQJWKDQGDVWDEOHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU´'2'2(6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1  Sharon  Burke,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Operational  Energy  Plans  and  Programs,  quoted  in  Defense  





7KH 'R'¶V HQergy profile (energy requirements and the means to meet them) is 
determined by millions of decisions spread throughout the workforce across all its activities.  
Energy decisions in DoD range from minute-to-minute choices, such as how fast to drive, to 
long-range strategic planning of the size of the force.  Other examples include choosing the type 
of generator that should power a facility, setting flight training requirements, designing or 
selecting a new generation of vehicles, and allocating research and development resources.  
A 2001 report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) identified decision processes that fail 
to consider the vulnerabilities associated with energy consumption, including a reduction in 
capability. Since the DSB (2001) report, and in compliance with guidance from Congress, in 
particular the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, DoD leaders have stated on numerous 
occasions that energy considerations will play a major role in decision making throughout the 
foreseeable future, and have EHJXQHIIRUWVWRLPSURYHWKH'R'¶VHQHUJ\SURILOH  
Any large organization faces a challenge in managing many decisions such that the 
choices made are in alignment with the overall strategy, and thus help the organization achieve 
its goals.  One of the primary approaches that defense and other public organizations use to 
achieve this alignment is defining strategic objectives and communicating them throughout the 
organization (Pirnie and Gardiner 1996; Paarlberg and Perry 2007; Casey et al. 2008).  The 
strategic objectives must be defined and measured such that they provide useful guidance for 
decision makers.  We are concerned primarily with ensuring that decision makers within DoD 
are considering a set of objectives consistent with the preferences of its leaders.  
By any measure, the DoD is one of the largest organizations in the world.  In seeking to 
change its energy profile, among its first steps was the issuance of strategic guidance with 
respect to energy. The Secretary of Defense, leadership in each military service, Congress, and 
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the White House have issued documents outlining energy strategies and policies.  Many of these 
documents provide information about objectives, either explicitly or implicitly, using the terms 
³JRDO´ ³YLVLRQ´ ³VWUDWHJ\´ ³SROLF\´ ³REMHFWLYH´ DQG HYHQ ³SLOODU´ WR UHIHU WR FRQVLGHUDWLRQV
underlying the evaluation of alternatives or motivation to search for new alternatives.  In keeping 
with the decision analysis literature, we use the term objective.  
 The strategic guidance communication has been very successful in bringing attention to 
HQHUJ\ DQG DFWLYDWLQJ GHFLVLRQV WKDW LPSURYH WKH 'R'¶V HQHUJ\ SURILOH WKURXJKRXW WKH
organization.  However, some challenges remain.  It is not always clear what objectives and 
metrics a decision maker within the DoD should use to guide and justify decisions in which 
energy is a factor, and it is difficult to ensure that decision makers across different parts of the 
DoD are consistent in their implementation of the strategies provided by DoD leadership.  The 
 purpose of this paper is to develop a comprehensive and clear set of energy-related objectives 
for decision making within the DoD, consistent with existing strategic guidance. This supports 
more effective communication about strategic values and can serve as a basis for communicating 
quantitative information about tradeoffs.  
We take a value-focused thinking (VFT) approach, using DoD strategic guidance related 
to energy as our source of information on leadership values.  VFT is widely used in the DoD 
(Parnell 2007) and in other public-sector decision contexts (Keefer, Kirkwood, and Corner 2004) 
in which a potentially large number of objectives must be considered.  VFT has been applied to 
several areas of defense, including psychological operations (Kerchner, Deckro, and Kloeber 
2001), communications networks (Davis, Deckro, and Jackson 2000), and information operations 




VFT differs from alternative-focused thinking, which begins by identifying possible 
alternatives, and then determines criteria for evaluation by availability, ease of measurement, and 
the extent to which they differ among the alternatives.  In VFT, on the other hand, the first and 
PRVW LPSRUWDQW VWHS LQ WKH DQDO\VLV LV WR LGHQWLI\ DQG FODULI\ WKH GHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ REMHFWLYHV
before alternatives are examined.  There are several benefits to this approach, including more 
effective communication among stakeholders, increased focus on the considerations most 
important to the decision makers, and even the generation of innovative alternatives that were 
previously unidentified (Keeney 1992; Parnell 2007).  However, VFT can still be used in a 
specific decision context where an existing set of alternatives has been presented (e.g. choosing 
among platform designs proposed in the early stages of an acquisition process).  Examples 
include Keeney and Sicherman (1983), von Winterfeldt (1987), Merrick et al. (2005), and Feng 
and Keller (2006).  In such cases, measurable attributes associated with the objectives should be 
defined, allowing the decision makers to use performance on the objectives as a basis for 
comparing the alternatives.  
 Communicating quantitative information about preferences and tradeoffs across levels of 
the organizational hierarchy would also help in overcoming organizational incentive mismatches 
and sub-optimization problems.  By providing insight into the objectives at higher levels of the 
organization, we improve the ability of individuals and groups within the DoD to make decisions 
consistent with DoD leadership preferences.  Eventually, the effort to systematize 
communication about objectives could support development of standardized metrics that may be 
compared throughout the entire organization.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the source 
documents and our review process and criteria for identifying objectives.  In Section 3, we 
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present our consolidated set of objectives.  In Section 4, we discuss other findings and compare 
our objectives to an existing value model used by the Navy to evaluate installation energy 




Parnell et al. (1998) refer to the formulation of objectives based on stakeholder-approved 
GRFXPHQWVDVWKH³JROGVWDQGDUG´DSSURDFKWRGHYHORSLQJPXOWLSOH-objective value models.  We 
reviewed 44 documents, 38 of them approved by DoD and federal leadership.  The complete list 
is provided in the Appendix.  All were issued since 2001, and most since 2010.  Most of the 
documents relate specifically to energy policy and strategy, while a few, such as the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) (DoD 2010) are more general strategic guidance.  The highest level 
guidance is given by White House and Congressional documents, such as the National Defense 
Authorization Act.  In addition to DoD-level guidance, documents specific to the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps are included.  Keeney (1988) advises thDW ³D EURDG UDQJH RI
VWDNHKROGHUJURXSVVKRXOGEHLQYROYHGWRJHQHUDWHEUHDGWKLQ WKHVXJJHVWHGREMHFWLYHV´ 7KXV
we also reviewed six documents from other governmental and private non-governmental 
organizations.  
2.2. C riteria for identifying objectives 
In this paper, we develop a comprehensive set of energy objectives relevant to the DoD that 
could help foster clear communication and the development of comparable metrics across the 
organization.  We do not attempt to define a set of objectives specific to a particular decision 
problem.  Rather, our primary purposes are to clarify stakeholder values and to resolve 
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inconsistencies among their stated objectives to the extent possible.  We develop a set of 
objectives that captures many energy-relevant values that stakeholders expressed in a variety of 
ways, often in different contexts. 
 Our main criterion for our set of objectives is that it should be comprehensive, i.e. it 
should include all energy-related considerations deemed important by the leadership as 
expressed in the document set.  However, we also consolidate and remove some identified 
objectives, to ensure that the resulting set of objectives is essential, controllable, and non-
redundant.  This is necessary to ensure that each objective conveys independent information, and 
to keep the set manageable and meaningful, which are among the desirable properties of a set of 
objectives as described by Keeney (1992).  Several features of our set of objectives may seem 
counterintuitive ± for example, the frequently-stated objective to maximize energy efficiency 
does not appear in our set.  This will be discussed thoroughly in Section 3. 
2.3. Types of objectives 
The purpose of this study is to identify a set of objectives that may be used as a basis for 
communication and for developing metrics for the DoD.  At this stage, we did not seek to define 
objectives that are measurable (precisely defined and quantifiable) and operational (measurable 
in a practical sense).  However, there are widely-used measures that are associated with some of 
the objectives, as discussed in Section 4.  
 Following Keeney (1992), we distinguish among three types of objectives: 
x fundamental (ends) objectives ± objectives that are inherently important in a 
decision context; these define why a decision exists and what decision makers are trying 
to achieve;  
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x means objectives ± objectives that are pursued because of their "implications for 
the degree to which [other] (more fundamental) objective[s] can be achieved" (Keeney 
1992, p. 34); 
x strategic objectives ± objectives that are fundamental to the entire set of 
stakeholders; they cannot be redefined as means objectives by association with more 
fundamental objectives of a subset of stakeholders. 
Fundamental objectives describe the issues that are of direct concern to stakeholders.  Means 
objectives describe relatHGLVVXHVWKDWDUHUHOHYDQWSULPDULO\EHFDXVHWKH\LQIOXHQFHDOWHUQDWLYHV¶
performance with respect to one or more of the fundamental objectives.  This distinction 
becomes particularly important in the later stages of a decision analysis; quantitative information 
about preferences should be elicited using fundamental objectives.  Keeney (2002) explains that 
evaluating tradeoffs using means objectives instead of fundamental objectives can lead to flawed 
decisions.   
 The distinction between fundamental and means objectives depends on the context of the 
decision; it is possible that an objective would be considered fundamental at one level of an 
organization, but would be a means objectives from the perspective of a stakeholder either at a 
higher level of the organizational hierarchy or outside the organization. At higher levels in an 
organization, decision problems tend to have a broader scope; they consider longer time horizons 
for both the implementation and impacts of decisions.  Accordingly, there may be more decision 
variables, and their possible ranges are likely to be wider.  For example, at the national level (the 
White House and Congress), the overall DoD appropriation for Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation is a reasonable decision variable to consider.  At the DoD level, the size of a 
Service ten years in the future is a reasonable decision variable.  At the Navy level, the number 
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of aircraft carriers in the fleet is a reasonable decision variable.  The scope of alternatives under 
consideration affects which objectives are fundamental to the given decision problem and which 
are means to influence those fundamental objectives.  In this work, we define as fundamental 
those objectives that are of direct concern at the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretary 
levels in the DoD for setting energy policy.  We consider objectives that are fundamental at the 
national level to be strategic objectives for DoD. 
 
3. Results 
We specify twelve objectives that the source documents identify as significant to many of the 
stakeholders.  Three are fundamental at the national level, and are considered strategic.  Three 
others are fundamental at the DoD level, and the remaining six are means objectives.  The 
objectives appear in Figure 1, and are organized into a fundamental objectives hierarchy 
followed by a high-level means-ends objectives network.  Each of these objectives is included 
implicitly or explicitly in several of the documents.  Each specific DoD energy decision would 
involve a more detailed means-ends network.  There are also objectives stated in source 
documents that are redundant, as detailed in Section 3.4.  Further discussion of how to 
operationalize the objectives is in Section 4.  The full details of which documents include which 
objectives, with specific quotes, are given as Table A.2 in a sponsored technical report produced 
by Whitney et al. (2013) for the Energy System Technology Evaluation Program (though some 
of the terminology differs).  A sample showing three documents and three objectives is provided 





Figure 1.  An objectives hierarchy and high-level means-ends network illustrating the energy 
objectives of concern at different organizational levels.  A dashed line indicates an indirect link; 
that is, there are likely to be intermediate means objectives in a specific decision situation. 
 
ID Document Minimize Vulnerability to A ttacks and Disruptions 
Minimize Threat of 
Conflicts and A ttacks 
Maximize Assurance 
of Energy Supply 
6 
Supporting the Mission 
with Operational 
Energy 
P. 1  ",W¶VDERXWLQFUHDVLQJRXU
IRUFHV¶HQGXUDQFHEHLQJPRUH
lethal, and reducing the number 
of men and women risking 






































































The proposed Change 
Strategy to Embed 
Energy Stewardship 
LQWRWKH$UP\¶V&XOWXUH 
P. 10  "The challenge is to 
successfully complete missions 
while reducting operational and 
tactical vulnerabilities 




Department of Defense 
Energy Strategy: 
Teaching an Old Dog 
New Tricks 
P. 20  "US dependence on huge 
amounts of oil and electricity to 
power our economy and our 





Security by decreasing US 
dependence on foreign oil"  




Table 1.  A small portion of the results documenting the appearance of each objective in the 
source documents.  The complete results are given in Table A.2 of Whitney et al. (2013). 
 
3.1. National Strategic Objectives 
Maximize National Security 
Security is challenging to define, but it   is   suggested   clearly   as   an   objective   in   20   of   the   44  
UHYLHZHG GRFXPHQWV DQG LV FHQWUDO WR WKH 'R' PLVVLRQ VWDWHPHQW ³The   mission   of   the  
Department  of  Defense  is   to  provide  the  military  forces  needed  to  deter  war  and  to  protect   the  
VHFXULW\RIRXUFRXQWU\´    We treat national security as defined by the three lower-level 
objectives that compose it, as discussed in Section 3.2.  
Maximize Net Economic Gains 
In the context of this work, this objective summarizes the impact of the resources expended to 
provide energy and, ultimately, some type of output.  The resources expended are not available 
for other purposes, which may affect other entities within the DoD, other federal government 
activities, and the nation as a whole.  The economic impacts are usually expressed in terms of the 
costs of providing energy, but there may also be secondary impacts of energy decisions within 
the DoD; for example, an innovation within the DoD may lead to the development of a new 
industry in the private sector. 
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Maximize Environmental Quality and Ecosystem Services  
Environmental quality refers to the health of the natural environment, and minimization of 
exposure and toxicity to humans and damage to animals and plants.  Ecosystem services refer to 
all resources and support provided by the natural environment, such as food, water, oxygen, and 
regulation of temperature.  A detailed exploration of ecosystem services is provided by Costanza 
et al. (1997).  Greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution are the issues most relevant to 
energy-related decisions faced by the DoD.  This objective captures considerations relevant to 
the nation as a whole, rather than exclusively to defense. 
3.2. Defense Fundamental Objectives 
As indicated in Figure 1, two objectives propagate down from the National Strategic Objectives 
with no significant elaboration in definition.  Environmental quality and ecosystem services are 
mentioned frequently in DoD documents, but no elaboration beyond the information in the 
national-level documents is given.  The only difference we observe with respect to net economic 
gains is that some types of impacts ± those not directly relevant to the DoD± are generally 
excluded from discussions at this level.  The national security objective, however, which is the 
primary purpose of the DoD, may be defined by decomposing it.  
Minimize Threat of Conflict and A ttacks 
DoD stakeholders would like to minimize the likelihood of conflicts anywhere in the world and 
attacks on US interests arising as a result of reliance on scarce resources controlled by 
governments of potentially non-friendly nations.  In the reviewed documents and elsewhere 
within the DoD, there is concern that conflicts may arise over the assurance of access to energy 
supplies, and that maintaining this access imposes constraints on U.S. foreign policy.  For 
 13 
 
H[DPSOH 5D\ 0DEXV WKH 6HFUHWDU\ RI WKH 1DY\ 6(&1$9 WHVWLILHG WKDW ³ZH ZRXOG EH
irrespRQVLEOHLIZHGLGQRWUHGXFHRXUGHSHQGHQFHRQIRUHLJQRLO´6FKZDUW]HWDO 
Maximize Mission Capability 
Mission capability is a broad term for the ability to carry out missions to achieve a desired goal.  
It includes many different sub-capabilities, and in a different type of study, it might be expanded 
into more specific objectives such as to maximize airlift capacity.  Many performance measures 
used to assess capability, such as endurance, range, speed, and payload are related to energy 
consumption. Not all mission capability relates to combat; humanitarian aid and disaster 
response is a non-combat capability that enhances security.  We discuss the challenges of 
defining and measuring mission capability further in Section 4.  
Minimize Vulnerability to A ttacks and Disruptions  
Vulnerability to attacks and disruptions refers to the potential to experience attacks or 
disruptions to energy supply  and to the magnitude of the impact if they occur.  Energy is related 
to vulnerability at the operational level, because the supply chain is a target for adversaries, as 
discussed earlier, as well as at higher levels, since ³>o]ver-reliance on petroleum is a critical 
strategic vulnerability IRUWKH1DY\´&KLHIRI1DYDO2SHUDWLRQV&12 
3.3. Means Objectives 
At the national and DoD levels, we have defined six strategic or fundamental objectives.  
However, at lower levels of the organization, it may be difficult for decision makers to relate the 
consequences of their decisions directly to these objectives.  Thus, we identify means objectives 
that relate to the fundamental objectives and can be used to evaluate operational decisions.  Of 
course, the number of possible means objectives for decisions throughout the entire DoD is 
enormous; we identify only those that are mentioned frequently in the guidance documents and 
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are applicable to most energy-related decisions.  In Section 4, we present an example of a 
possible means-ends network for a decision related to energy technology upgrades for Navy and 
Marine Corps installations. 
 
Maximize Assurance of Energy Supply 
Assurance of energy supply, in this context, refers to the availability of energy at the time and 
place it is needed for a given mission.  Maximizing assurance of energy supply is a good 
example of an objective that can be considered a means objective for stakeholders at higher 
levels of the organization, but is a fundamental objective for many decision makers at an 
operational level. 
Minimize Attrition of People and Platforms 
An argument could be made for treating attrition of people and platforms as a particular type of 
economic impact, but it is also important because lost assets often cannot be replaced 
immediately and can reduce assurance of energy supply in the short-term, which decreases 
mission capability and increases vulnerability to attacks and disruptions. 
Minimize Logistics Requirements 
Logistics activities consume resources other than fuel, such as spare parts, and food and water 
for personnel.  Moreover, logistics operations may become a target of attack, and they impose 
additional organizational and management challenges. 
Minimize Energy Consumption 
Energy consumption is the quantity of fuel, power, or other energy used.  Depending on the 
context of the decision, it may be summarized in an aggregate measure, or categorized by 
location, purpose, or form (e.g. by fuel type). 
Maximize Use of Non-Fossil Energy Sources 
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This objective refers to the ability to obtain and use energy from sources such as solar, wind, or 
ELRIXHOV RU HYHQ QXFOHDU HQHUJ\  0DQ\ RI WKHVH VRXUFHV DUH GHVFULEHG DV ³DOWHUQDWLYH´ RU
³UHQHZDEOH´VLQFHWKHWRWDOJOREDOVXpply is not fixed.  The use of sources other than fossil fuels 
diversifies energy supply, and thus reduces vulnerability to attacks and disruptions and price 
volatility, and it generally reduces harmful emissions, which affect environmental quality and 
ecosystem services.  It also reduces dependence on foreign sources, which may affect the threats 
faced. 
Maximize Motivation to Improve DoD Energy Profile 
This objective UHIHUV WR WKHZRUNIRUFH¶V DZDUHQHVV RI energy issues and incentive to look for 
alternatives to improve performance with respect to all of the other objectives.  Culture change, 
LQFHQWLYHVDQGIRUWKH0DULQH&RUSV³HWKRV´ZHUHPHQWLRQHGIUHTXHQWO\DQGSURPLQHQWO\LQWKH
strategic guidance from every service.  Motivation to improve DoD energy profile is the 
quintessential means objective; it influences the achievement of virtually every other objective at 
the operational level.  It creates conditions for easier implementation and sustainment of changes 
in the energy profile as well as identification of more and better alternatives in the future.  It is 
similar to a process objective, as defined by Keeney and von Winterfeldt (2011); in this case, it 
influences the likelihood of good alternatives being identified and implemented successfully.   
3.4. Redundant Objectives 
As discussed earlier, the primary criterion for our set of objectives is completeness.  However, 
there are several objectives that were mentioned in many of the documents that are deliberately 
excluded.  We discuss below the way our objectives set captures four such excluded objectives. 
Energy Security 
Many of the documents refer to energy security, usually as an overarching term to capture all 
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issues of concern relative to DoD energy.  Roughead et al. (2012) expand the definition beyond 
HQHUJ\DQGJRVRIDUDVWRVWDWHWKDW³HQHUJ\VHFXULW\DQGQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\DUHLQFUHDVLQJO\EHLQJ
VHHQ DV RQH DQG WKH VDPH´  +RZHYHU WKH GRFXPHQWV GHILQH HQHUJ\ VHFXULW\ LQ D QXPEHU RI
different ways, and each definition is composed of one or more of the objectives in our set.  For 
example, the Chief of Naval Operations (2010) defines energy security as follows: 
³(QHUJ\VHFXULW\LVKDYLQJDVVXUHGDFFHVV WRUHOLDEOHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHVXSSOLHVRIHQHUJ\
and the ability to protect and deliver suIILFLHQWHQHUJ\WRPHHWRSHUDWLRQDOQHHGV´ 
This definition is very similar to assurance of energy supply.  The Army defines energy security 
similarly, but also mentions renewable sources.  The Army Senior Energy Council and the Office 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Partnerships (2009) define energy 
security as: 
³SUHYHQWLQJ ORVV RI DFFHVV WR SRZHU DQG IXHO VRXUFHV VXUHW\ HQVXULQJ UHVLOLHQFH LQ
energy systems (survivability), accessing alternative and renewable energy sources 
available on installations (supply), providing adequate power for critical missions 
VXIILFLHQF\ DQG SURPRWLQJ VXSSRUW IRU WKH $UP\¶V PLVVLRQ LWV FRPPXQLW\ DQG WKH
HQYLURQPHQWVXVWDLQDELOLW\´ 
This is simply a list of means objectives, all of which are captured either implicitly or explicitly 
in Section 3.3.  We do not include energy security in our objectives set, as it is captured by the 
other objectives. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency, which we define as the ratio of a desired output to the amount of input used, is an 
objective mentioned frequently in the documents.  It is sometimes unitless, as when both 
numerator and denominator are in the same units (e.g. the efficiency of a battery).  It can also 
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measure the rate of transformation of an input to an output, such as miles traveled per unit of fuel 
consumed.  In either case, if both the output (numerator) and input (denominator) are represented 
in the set of objectives, including efficiency is redundant.  The denominator in energy efficiency 
measures is captured by the energy consumption objective, and the numerator is captured by 
other desired outputs (primarily mission capability).  Hence, we do not include efficiency. 
Sustainability 
Much like energy security, the term sustainability (or sustainable) is used frequently ± it appears 
in about half of the reviewed documents ± but is generally not defined. When it is defined, it is 
composed of objectives that do appear in the set.  For example, the DoD Strategic Sustainability 
Performance Plan (DoD 2012) states ³7KH >'R'@ YLVLRQ RI VXVWDLQDELOLW\ LV WR PDLQWDLQ WKH
ability to operate into the future without decline²either in the mission or in the natural and man-
made systems that support it.´  This is captured primarily by mission capability and its 
supporting means objectives.  The only added consideration is the time dimension ± 
sustainability means that objectives are achieved over time, not just instantaneously.  However, 
in a quantitative value model based on our set of objectives, this could be captured by using an 
intertemporal value model that includes a time index on each attribute, rather than by adding 
another objective. 
Weight 
Weight is another objective that appears in several documents.  For example, the United States 
Marine Corps (2011) explicitly FDOOVLWDQREMHFWLYH³7KHREMHFWLYHLVWRDOORZ0DULQHVWRWUDYHO
lighter²with less²and move faster by reducing size and amount of equipment and dependence 
RQ EXON VXSSOLHV´  7KH 1DY\ LQFOXGHV ZHLJKW DV ZHOO WKH &12  VWDWHV ³WR SURYLGH
operationDODGYDQWDJHV WKDW UHVRQDWHDFURVVVHDDLUDQG ODQG WKH1DY\ZLOO µOLJKWHQ WKH ORDG¶
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physically and in terms of power consumption, through weight-reducing advances to airframes, 
vehicles, and weapon casings, energy efficient technologies, or changes to SROLF\´  $V
described, weight is a means objective supporting the reduction of energy consumption and 
logistics requirements.  Weight is a central component of logistics requirements, and is often 
relatively easy to measure.  While we exclude it from our set of broader objectives, it is a good 




In order to compare specific alternatives in energy-related decisions, it is important to be able to 
TXDQWLI\ HDFK DOWHUQDWLYH¶V DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH UHOHYDQW REMHFWLYHV  4XDQWLWDWLYHPHDVXUHV DUH
vital to allow decision makers to think coherently about tradeoffs among objectives, which are 
often competing.  Stakeholders are often willing to make statements about the relative 
LPSRUWDQFH RI YDULRXV REMHFWLYHV VXFK DV ³FRVW DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV DUH HTXDOO\ LPSRUWDQW´
However, without a clear understanding of the measurement scales and the ranges within which 
tradeoffs are being considered, such statements are meaningless.  An unambiguous tradeoff 
statement requires specific measurement scales and ranges.  For example, the following 
statement is clear and can be used to compare desirability of alternative performance levels 
quantitatively: a $10M life-F\FOHFRVWGLIIHUHQWLDOLV³HTXDOO\LPSRUWDQW´WRD-knot differential 
in top speed. 
Quantitative measures are especially important in large organizations such as the DoD 
that include many distributed decision makers.  It is clear that if one DoD decision maker 
chooses to spend $50,000 to reduce annual consumption of diesel fuel by 5,000 gallons, and 
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another DoD decision maker declines to spend $20,000 to reduce annual consumption of diesel 
fuel by 5,000 gallons, preferences of senior leadership have not been applied properly to both 
decisions.  It is extremely difficult to ensure that tradeoffs are evaluated consistently across 
decision makers without quantitative guidance.  In this example, there could be organization-
wide guidance specifying the maximum amount of money to be spent per unit of reduction in 
annual consumption of diesel fuel.  One of the drawbacks of purely qualitative guidance is that it 
can be interpreted very differently by various decision makers within the organization; 
qualitative guidance should be viewed as an important first step in defining organizational 
preferences. 
Natural Measures 
The means objectives suggest a few natural measures that are reasonably straightforward to 
measure, and in some cases are comparable across different parts of the organization.  Energy 
consumption may be the simplest to measure, as discussed earlier, in units of energy (such as 
kilowatt-hours) or fuel consumption. The importance of energy consumption may therefore differ 
based on where it occurs ± for example, reducing energy consumption in a forward-deployed 
environment may be more valuable than the same reduction at an installation in the U.S.  
Measures of energy consumption may need to be split by type and location. 
Assurance of energy supply also suggests a natural measure: the probability that mission 
demand is met over a certain period under given circumstances, or equivalently, one minus the 
probability of failing to meet the demand.  Assurance measures are specific to a mission, and 
while the nominal units may be the same, they are not equivalent across decision contexts, since 
the importance of the missions and the consequences of failure may differ substantially.  
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Assurance of energy supply will therefore often need to be defined relative to a given geographic, 
temporal, or mission scope. 
Attrition of people and platforms can be measured in natural units, either aggregating or 
separating loss of lives and loss of assets.   However, the challenge with respect to this objective 
is prediction.  For example, in retrospect, it is straightforward to estimate attrition to the logistics 
convoys supplying fuel to NATO forces in Afghanistan (Eady et al. 2009).  When decisions are 
made regarding acquisition of fuel-consuming assets and deployment of troops, however, 
estimating attrition or its relationship with these alternatives is extremely challenging.  It is 
possible that a given attrition measure (e.g. lives lost) may be comparable across decision 
contexts, and equivalent in terms of organizational preferences.  This would imply similar 
tradeoffs with respect to other objectives.  For example, if stakeholders believe it is worth 60,000 
barrels of F-76 (a type of diesel fuel) energy consumption to save one statistical life in a 
particular decision context, that same information about preferences between these two 
objectives would likely apply elsewhere. 
Measuring Mission Capability 
The term mission capability, or often simply capability, is often used in DoD as a desirable 
quantity to maximize, but it is rarely defined precisely, and therefore it is difficult to measure. 
Air Force Policy Directive 90-GHILQHV FDSDELOLW\ DV ³>W@KH FRPELQHG FDSDFLW\ RI SHUVRQQHO
materiel, equipment, and information in measured quantities, under specified conditions, that, 
DFWLQJWRJHWKHULQDSUHVFULEHGVHWRIDFWLYLWLHVFDQEHXVHGWRDFKLHYHDGHVLUHGRXWSXW´,QRWKHU
words, capability is defined within the context of a detailed scenario, which specifies an 




replenish another vessel while underway.  Capability is also used to refer to much more complex 
IXQFWLRQVVXFKDV³ORQJ-UDQJHVWULNHFDSDELOLW\´DQG³VSDFHFDSDELOLW\´'R' 
 DoD capabilities are grouped into nine top-level Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), with 
further hierarchical elaboration (DoD 2011).  Within the relatively narrow context of installation 
energy, Samaran and Willis (2013) proposed a capabilities-based planning framework for 
evaluating DoD installation energy assurance alternatives, and identified 45 relevant JCAs at the 
second through fifth hierarchical levels.  Disaggregating capability even to a single level would 
dwarf the remainder of the hierarchy, while only a small portion of the additional detail would be 
relevant for any given energy decision context.  Therefore, we do not elaborate further on 
measures of mission capability.  Rather, we identify other objectives that need to be evaluated so 
their impact on performance with respect to capability and preference tradeoffs may be evaluated 
in specific analyses.  For example, the USMC Marine Air-Ground Task Force uses a power and 
energy model (MPEM) which relates fuel consumption to the number of vehicles that can 
operate, within a given constraint. 
Targets 
In some cases, the strategic guidance expresses energy objectives as binary targets.  For example, 
the SECNAV (2009) introduced five energy targets for the Department of the Navy (DON), 
briefly: 
1. Contracts: include energy evaluation factors in contracts; 
2. Green Strike Group: in 2012, sail a strike group on nuclear and biofuel power only, and 
in 2016, deploy a fleet including aircraft flying on only biofuels; 
3. Consumption: reduce petroleum use by 50%; 
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4. Alternative Sources: half of shore-based energy produced on-installation and from non-
fossil-fuel sources by 2020; and 
5. Alternative Sources: half of all DON energy derived from non-fossil-fuel sources by 
2020.   
Targets are generally specified with respect to an objective, often one that is a means objective at 
the high level, but a fundamental objective at lower levels.  Targets can be expressed in terms of 
PXOWLSOH REMHFWLYHV WKH 6(&1$9¶V7DUJHW  LQFOXGHV ERWK WKH VRXUFH RI HQHUJ\ use of non-
fossil energy sources) and the location at which the energy is generated (related to assurance of 
energy supply).  Targets 2-5 are consistent with our set of objectives.  In particular, Targets 2, 4, 
and 5 focus on maximizing use of non-fossil energy sources, and Target 3 addresses a 
combination of minimizing energy consumption and maximizing use of non-fossil energy 
sources.  Target 1 is an initiative that the SECNAV believes will support the pursuit of the 
objectives by encouraging consideration of them in a particular class of decisions. 
 Bordley and Kirkwood (2004) discuss assessment of preferences in situations where 
attributes are defined in this way and stakeholders do not care about the degree to which a target 
is missed or is exceeded.  However, we are skeptical that these binary targets truly capture the 
SECNAV's preferences.  Rather, targets are a policy tool often used by managers at a high level 
in an organization to improve motivation of decision makers at lower levels, and to focus their 
DWWHQWLRQ RQ LPSRUWDQW REMHFWLYHV &DVH\ HW DO   7KH 6(&1$9¶V WDUJHWV KDYH EHHQ
effective in this respect.  When a decision maker is trying to help the organization meet these 
targets, however, there is no guidance about how other considerations should be balanced against 
the specific objectives included in the targets.  For example, if running a fleet on biofuels 
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requires reducing the maximum speed of some of the vessels, or if it requires maintaining a 
longer supply chain, is that choice consistent with the SECNAV's preferences?   
 An additional challenge for decision makers relying on these targets is that most 
individual decisions will have very little impact on whether or not a target is met.  This makes it 
even more difficult to use the targets to assess the relative value of improved performance on 
each objective.  The set of targets gives some insight into the objectives the SECNAV would like 
to pursue, but a helpful further step would be to provide guidelines about what sorts of tradeoffs 
between objectives are appropriate. 
Differences Across Services 
In addition to the differences across organizational levels discussed earlier, there are noticeable 
differences in the frequency with which objectives appear in documents from each of the military 
services.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of documents from each service that included each 
objective.  While this is by no means a rigorous measure of the services' priorities, it does 
provide some interesting qualitative information.  The Air Force appears to be more explicitly 
concerned about cost than the other services are.  Motivation to improve DoD energy profile also 
appears in every Air Force document.  The Marines focus on expeditionary sustainability, which 
emphasizes decreasing energy consumption; they are less concerned with vulnerability to attacks 
and disruptions and assurance of energy supply.  The Air Force and Navy both focus heavily on 





Figure 2.  The percentage of source documents from each service that include each of the twelve 
objectives. 
Example: Energy Return on Investment (eROI) Tool 
As part of its implementation of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 
(2009) for shore energy management, the CNO issued OPNAVINST 4100.5E (Department of 
WKH1DY\ZKLFKVSHFLILFDOO\UHTXLUHVSULRULWL]LQJHQHUJ\SURSRVDOV³VROHly based on eROI 
FULWHULD´S 7KHH52,FULWHULDDUHGHILQHGDQGDVXPPDU\PHDVXUHRIH52, LV FDOFXODWHG
using a spreadsheet-based tool that takes data for each proposed project and uses a multi-attribute 
function to calculate an eROI value, as well as to report summary scores in subcategories.  The 
eROI tool is therefore highly influential in determining the project selection decisions for 




























































Command (NAVFAC) (2012), shows the eROI objectives hierarchy which formed the basis for 
the tool. 
 
Figure 3.  The objectives hierarchy used as the basis for the eROI spreadsheet.  Reproduced from 
NAVFAC (2012).  MDI stands for Mission Dependency Index. 
 
Table 2 describes how our five bottom-level fundamental objectives are addressed (or not 
addressed) by the eROI value model.  Many of the means objectives we identify are captured in 
the eROI hierarchy.  Energy consumption is stated explicitly, assurance of energy supply is 
phrased as "reliable energy" (and measured by outage exposure), and motivation to improve DoD 
energy profile is arguably addressed by VRPHRI WKHPHWULFV VXSSRUWLQJ WKH ³GHYHORS HQDEOLQJ
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´REMHFWLYH  Use of non-fossil energy sources is related to the ³energy flexibility´ 
and ³tech adoption´ metrics.   
However, several of the fundamental objectives are not fully captured and therefore the 
eROI REMHFWLYHVVHWYLRODWHV.HHQH\¶VFRPSOHWHQHVVFULWHULRQBond, Carlson & Keeney 
(2008) found that individuals can typically identify only about half of their own objectives. It is 
possible that this result would apply to group objectives generation processes to some extent as 
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well, and may explain why the fundamental objectives to minimize threat of conflict and attacks 
and minimize vulnerability to attacks and disruptions are not explicitly included.  While some of 
the eROI metrics have means relationships to these objectives, as noted in Table 2, the structure 
of the qualitative value model (Figure 3) would make it difficult to capture the value 
contributions of, for example, reduction in fossil fuel consumption on national security threats. 
F igure 1 
Fundamental Objective Related eR O I Objectives Comments 
Maximize Mission 
Capability 
Provide Reliable Energy to 
Shore Infrastructure 
Assurance is a means objective 
supporting capability; it is not 
clear whether the eROI objective 
captures all benefits of on-site 
power generation. 
Minimize Vulnerability to 
Attacks and Disruptions 
Provide Reliable Energy to 
Shore Infrastructure 
Assurance is a means objective; 
eROI metrics do not reflect cause 
of outage (environmental or 
adversarial). 
Minimize Threat of 
Conflicts and Attacks 
Minimize Shore Energy 
Consumption 
Consumption is a means objective; 
there is no indication that the eROI 
value model captures impact of 
reduced consumption on threats. 
Maximize Net Economic 
Gains 
Maximize Financial Benefits, 
Minimize Shore Energy 
Consumption 
The eROI model considers only 
direct cost savings, not broader 
economic impacts. 
Maximize Environmental 
Quality and Ecosystem 
Services 
Minimize Shore Energy 
Consumption, Develop 
Enabling Infrastructure 
Consumption is a means objective; 
enabling infrastructure is clearly 
not fundamental; the metrics 
supporting enabling infrastructure 
may not capture all contributions 
to environmental impacts. 
Table 2.  A comparison between the DoD fundamental objectives identified in Section 3.2 and 
the objectives and metrics used in the eROI value model shown in Figure 3. 
 
In addition, the set of eROI objectives violates both decomposability and non-
redundancy, identified by Keeney (1992) as desirable properties of an objectives set.  Using a 
separate objective (fourth objective in Figure 3) to capture the value of meeting mandates that 
relate to consumption and financial benefits creates the possibility of double-counting the value 
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associated with some impacts.  For example, efficient lighting and photovoltaic projects 
contribute to financial cost savings and to reducing installation energy consumption.  They also 
contribute to meeting SECNAV targets and executive and legislative mandates, such as the 
UHTXLUHPHQW RI([HFXWLYH2UGHU   IRU QHZ IHGHUDO EXLOGLQJV WR DFKLHYH ³QHW-]HUR´
(on-site power generation exceeds total requirement) by 2030.  Since the mandates were 
motivated by the same strategic objectives of national security, net economic gains, and 
environmental quality and ecosystem services, the design of the eROI tool appears to double-
credit some project impacts.  VFT principles suggest that removing the fourth eROI objective, 
and creating one or more new objectives (if needed) to capture any aspects of higher-level 
preferences conveyed in the mandates that are not already covered by other objectives, would 
lead to a better quantitative value model. 
The means-ends relationships among objectives shown in Figure 1 clarify the 
mechanisms by which means objectives and possible metrics support the strategic objectives. 
Understanding these relationships would support developing value models that better reflect 
strategic guidance.  The eROI spreadsheet reveals some features that appear inconsistent with the 
strategic guidance, and could be made more consistent by a more careful consideration of the 
means-ends relationships.  For example, the eROI spreadsheet includes the financial cost and 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with energy consumption.  However, as shown in Figure 1, 
minimize threat of conflict and attacks is also one of the fundamental objectives supported by the 
energy consumption objective (and, we would argue, a very important one), but it is not captured 
in the eROI tool.  By missing the contribution of consumption to threats, it by extension misses 
FRQVXPSWLRQ¶VLPSDFWRQnational security.  
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 In the eROI spreadsheet, mission capability is measured in terms of assurance, 
specifically the critical facilities supported and the ability to provide required energy during a 
supply disruption.  However, it is not clear that it captures the potential of installation energy 
projects to reduce the frequency or likelihood of outages.  The eROI spreadsheet credits a project 
that generates electrical power on-site as part of the objective to ³achieve regulatory compliance 
and stakeholder expectations.´  Given that weights are assessed for the five top-level objectives, 
it is not clear that the value of on-site power generation in reducing the likelihood of disruption 
(and hence increasing assurance of energy supply) is captured. 
The implementation of strategic guidance in the eROI spreadsheet illustrates some of the 
potential problems that can arise when measuring value with a quantitative tool based on a set of 
objectives whose interrelationships are not modeled carefully. Figure 4 shows a means-ends 
network based on VFT principles. The network excludes some means objectives that are not 
substantially influenced by decisions in this context, such as attrition.  It includes more detailed 
means objectives that are directly relevant to installation energy technology and may be forecast 
or estimated based on knowledge about the technology under consideration, such as 
³&RPPHUFLDO*ULG3RZHU'HPDQG´DQG³)HHGEDFN WR(QGXVHU.´  This network illustrates how 








Decisions relating to energy within the DoD will have significant consequences in both the short 
term and the long term.  There is a wealth of published DoD guidance regarding energy, but a 
lack of precision and consistency limits its practical usefulness in analyzing energy decisions.  A 
VFT approach can help provide structure to decisions at all levels of the organization by 
identifying objectives, illustrating connections between fundamental and means objectives, 
suggesting possible ways of quantifying objectives, and providing a basis for evaluating specific 
tradeoffs among competing objectives. The eROI tool shows some of the challenges and 
inconsistencies that can arise when developing a quantitative value model based on an objectives 
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structure that does not follow VFT principles. Achieving the benefits of VFT is vital to ensuring 
that future energy decisions are consistent with the higher-level preferences of the organization 
and the nation. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 lists the 44 documents reviewed in this work.  Full citation information, quotes, and 
additional details about the documents are included in a technical report created by Whitney et 
al. (2013).  The majority of the documents are available online to the public. 
ID Document Source 
1 Sustain the Mission. Secure the Future. The Army Strategy for the 
Environment 
Army 
2 Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy Army 
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ID Document Source 
3 Energy Security:  Army Priority and National Imperative Army 
4 Use of the Army's Strategic Management System (SMS) to Track Army 
Energy Security Implementation Strategy (AESIS) Performance 
Army 
5 Army Energy Enterprise Army 
6 Supporting the Mission with Operational Energy Army 
7 The Proposed Change Strategy to Embed Energy Stewardship into the 
Army's Culture 
Army 
8 Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks Brookings 
9 Fueling the "Balance": A Defense Energy Strategy Primer Brookings 
10 Energy Policy Act of 2005 Congress 
11 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 Congress 
12 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 Congress 




14 More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden DoD 
15 More Fight ± Less Fuel DoD 
16 Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives DoD 
17 Quadrennial Defense Review Report DoD 
18 Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy DoD 
19 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America DoD 
20 Operational Energy Strategy: Implementation Plan DoD 
21 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense DoD 
22 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007:  Major Provisions of 
Interest to Federal Energy Managers 
Federal Energy 
Management Program 
23 Transforming the Way DoD Looks at Energy: an Approach to Establishing 
an Energy Strategy 
Logistics Management 
Institute 
24 Naval Energy:  A Strategic Approach Navy 
25 The Department of the Navy's Energy Goals Navy 
26 A Navy Energy Vision for the 21st Century Navy 
27 Energy Evaluation Factors in the Acquisition Process Navy 
28 Department of the Navy (DON) Objectives for FY 2012 and Beyond Navy 
29 Shore Energy Management (OPNAV Instruction 4100.5E) Navy 
30 Energy Program for Security and Independence Navy 
31 Reenergizing America's Defense: How the Armed Forces are Stepping 
Forward to Combat Climate Change and Improve the U.S. Energy Posture 
Pew 
32 Air Force Energy Program Policy Memorandum Air Force 
33 Air Force Acquisition & Technology Energy Plan Air Force 
34 Air Force Aviation Operations Energy Plan Air Force 
35 Air Force Energy Plan Air Force 
36 Air Force Infrastructure Energy Plan Air Force 
37 U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan Air Force 
38 WK&RPPDQGDQWRIWKH0DULQH&RUSV&RPPDQGDQW¶V3ODQQLQJ*XLGDQFH Marine Corps 
39 Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025: Implementation Planning Guidance Marine Corps 
40 USMC Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan: Bases to 
Battlefield 
Marine Corps 
41 Executive Order No. 13423 White House 
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ID Document Source 
42 Executive Order No. 13514 White House 
43 National Security Strategy White House 
44 Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future White House 
Table A-1.  A list of recent documents relevant to DoD energy policy included in this analysis. 
